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International Migration, 
Development, and Policy: 
Reconsidering Migration Transition 
Theory—A Way Forward 
 
 
Migration transition theories have been contested as they informed immigration 
policy in the Global North, which—based on assumptions that immigrants from 
developing countries may be a threat to social stability and economic opportunity—
aimed to diminish emigration from the South. Development policies were proposed 
that could produce a “migration transition” in the South, where it was assumed 
that improved economic development would act as a substitute for migration and 
lead to minimal emigration, thus reducing overall immigration to the Global North. 
However, policies did not result in a migration transition. Acknowledging 
problematic rhetoric and contradictory policy and outcomes, this paper addresses 
key deficiencies of migration transition models. By reconsidering how migration 
transition frameworks could be modified to inform immigration policy, we may 
pursue theoretical and methodological paths for future empirical inquiries on 
development and international migration. 
 
 
Karin A. C. Johnson  
University of California, Riverside 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In recent years, policymakers in affluent countries in the Global North have moved 
to make immigration policies and vetting procedures more restrictive. They have 
alluded that migrants and refugees from the South could threaten the disintegration 
of social stability (Bonvin 1996; France24 2015). Preoccupation with national 
security by developed nations’ politicians and the civil sphere and their concerns 
about incoming migrants from developing countries is not novel (Castles, De Haas, 
& Miller 2014). Some current immigration policy in the Global North bears 
vestiges of updates from the 1990s. These revisions were put into place following 
a debate beginning in the 1960s and 1970s that evaluated how development could 
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reduce immigration from the South. Economists monopolized the debate and 
introduced resolutions to curb migration via development policies based on 
economic equilibrium models. It was projected that increased development would 
lead to a short-term 'migration hump' in developed countries and a 'migration 
transition' in developing countries (Martin & Taylor 1996). Given this historically 
problematic approach to policy, migration transition theory should not be wholly 
abandoned but be revisited. I argue that migration transition frameworks can inform 
appropriate long-term policies. Strategies that reflect international migration and 
development trends must apply to the interest and safety of nations, international 
organizations, and individual migrants.   
 
Migration transition theories emerged in the 1960s and 70s as part of a 
debate about development and the consequences of globalization and whether 
migration caused development or whether development induced migration. Frank 
(1969, 1979) and Papademetriou (1985) contended that emigration from the Global 
South led to further underdevelopment in those areas. Others concluded that 
international migration would spur modernization and productivity, benefiting both 
sending and receiving countries (Alder 1981; Pennix 1982). What remained from 
the debate at the end of the 20th century was that some policy in the North was 
informed by the false perception that immigrants from the South were poor, 
uneducated, unskilled youth from “backward rural areas” who came to capital-rich 
countries to improve their relative wellbeing by occupying low-income jobs, and 
absorption of these immigrants into the labor force would lead to increased levels 
of national unemployment (Piore 1979, 3; Bonvin 1996, 7; Collier 2013, 84). As a 
result, the view that immigration from less developed countries should diminish to 
protect national social and economic wellbeing in the North was legitimated.  
 
Economic equilibrium models predicted that developing the Global South 
would act as a direct substitute for migration (Taylor 1996, 11). In the 1990s, 
supranational organizations implemented neoliberal development policies, 
including restructuring plans, international trade, foreign aid, foreign direct 
investment (FDI), and debt relief, to ameliorate conditions in developing nations. 
One such policy that depicts this period is NAFTA (the 1994 North American Free 
Trade Agreement), which aimed to increase trade exchange among the US, Canada, 
and Mexico and assumed job creation would reduce immigration. Yet cross-border 
mobility increased. As the NAFTA example suggests, despite the implementation 
of economic development policies and the adoption of selectively restrictive 
immigration policies by the North, migration between developing to developed 
countries continues. Recent research shows international migration and 
development are complementary, not causal. While migration can affect real 
2
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structural political and economic change in sending and receiving societies, the 
effects are limited (De Haas 2009). 
 
Migration Transition Theories 
 
Problematic immigration policy objectives based on economic equilibrium models 
that were proposed as ‘a solution to resolving the problem’ of immigration from 
the South prompted me to reassess migration transition theory. Migration transition 
theory posits that through development countries experience a transition over time 
from predominantly migrant-sending to migrant-receiving, and emigration 
eventually falls close to zero. There are two primary approaches to migration 
theory, demographic and economic, which, respectively, explain migrational 
changes as related to national population and fiscal increases.  
 
Demographic migration transition theory is illustrated through Zelinsky’s 
(1971) hypothesis that population change occurs through vital and mobility 
transitions over space and time. Zelinsky applied principles of spatial diffusion to 
the classic demographic population equation, population change = natural increase 
+ net migration, where net population change is the sum of natural increase (births 
less deaths) and net migration (immigration less emigration). Zelinsky devised five 
stages of curvilinear spatiotemporal mobility transitions. These are concisely 
summarized by Appleyard’s (1992) four-stage transition model (Figure 1.1 below). 
Zelinsky concluded that mobility transitions were linked to progressive, irreversible 
demographic social changes brought about through modernization. Notably, 
Zelinsky (1971, 48) raised a crucial question regarding demographic and migration 
transitions concerning the population carry capacity theorem and development, 
asking: “When and how will mobility saturation be reached?”  
 
The second type of migration transition model is based on the concept of 
economic equilibrium, which is the foundation of neoclassical economic migration 
theories (Sjaasad 1962; Todaro 1969). In contrast to curvilinear demographic 
models, it assumes a linear relationship where economic revenue is inversely 
proportional to migration rates, which are expected to reach equilibrium. At the 
threshold point, economic conditions (e.g., relative cross-national wage 
differentials) would become equal, resulting in zero net migration. Martin and 
Taylor (1996) employed this type of theory in their model of a ‘migration hump’ 
(Figure 1.2), which was used to inform development policies meant to diminish 
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Figure 1. Migration Transition Models 
 
1.1. Demographic Transition Model (Appleyard 1992) 
 
1.2. Economic Transition Model (Martin and Taylor 1996) 
 
1.3. Migration-Development Transition Model (De Haas 2010) 
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unwanted immigration to the Global North. Their model was based on the 
assumption that with the increased economic development of the Global South 
through international trade, gross national income (GNI) levels would gradually 
rise. This would lead to a short-term migration bump (due to more people being 
able to migrate from the South to the North as a result of their increased wages), 
followed by a decline in migration to zero when national incomes were relatively 
equivalent (a 'migration trough'). Martin and Taylor acknowledged that if trade 
and migration were substitutes, a migration trough would result. In contrast, if 
they were complements, a migration hump would stabilize as a ‘migration 
plateau.’ 
 
Skeldon (1997) critiqued Zelinsky's theory. He found it described a 
unilinear, deterministic, and universal system based on a generalized historical 
sequence of industrialization, demographic changes, and migration trends in 
present-day developed countries (mostly Western Europe). Skeldon pointed out 
that processes of social and economic development and concomitant mobility 
change, as experienced in Europe, may not equally apply to contemporary 
developing countries. There is no unique pattern of mobility change. More recently, 
De Haas (2010) reviewed demographic and economic migration transition models. 
Like Skeldon, he concluded that despite weaknesses and omissions in classic 
models that by amending hypotheses to fit available data, transition theories could 
yield valuable insights into structured regularities in international migration 
patterns. These frameworks incorporate social structure and agency, as well as 
account for stagnation in and reversibility of immigration flows. Thus, they explain 
how development processes are systematically, causally linked to mobility. 
 
De Haas (2010) hypothesized that human and economic development 
generally leads to higher levels of migration through increasing personal 
capabilities, aspirations, and occupational specialization, where international 
development is associated with a nonlinear sequence of migration transitions. In 
the modified version of migration-development transition theory (Figure 1.3), the 
model assumes that as development increases, migrants will pursue better 
opportunities, such that out-migration would grow more quickly than in-migration. 
Emigration would overtake immigration (a 'migration hump'). A hump is produced 
when emigration hits a critical threshold at some degree of development, followed 
by a gradual drop. Immigration would continue to steadily grow, leading to 
emigration and immigration attaining a point of equilibrium at high levels of 
development. Once developmental progress has advanced past equilibrium, 
migration patterns would reach a period of higher in-migration, where out-
migration would taper off in an inverse-U shape.  
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As a whole, demographic-mobility transition models are based on a theory 
that population increases resulting from modernization processes drive movement, 
and economic transition models are based on a theory that the less fortunate move 
toward locales of higher wages. While these frameworks are quite different 
theoretically, they are superficially analogous. All approaches use measures of 
development (e.g., societal modernization, economic development, or trade) as the 
variable explaining changes to migration. A visual comparison of Figure 1.1 Stage 
3 and Figures 1.2 and 1.3 suggests that development should lead to migration 
transition(s), which end with high immigration and little to no emigration.  
 
Limitations of Migration Transition Theories 
 
Although transition models by Zelinsky and Martin and Taylor are theoretically 
sound, they have flaws to the extent that they are inapplicable to long-term 
international migration trends. De Haas’ model is more relevant since it 
incorporates amendments from these models and employs substantive migrational 
data, acting as a sliding ruler describing potential migration-development 
combinations, but it lacks theoretical predictive and explanatory power due to data 
limitations outside the researcher’s control. The transition models have three main 
shortcomings: (1) they misrepresent global mobility equality; (2) they inaccurately 
account for the role that the state plays in shaping international migration patterns; 
and (3) there is little evidence that international migration from the South to the 
North has diminished since the 1990s.  
 
The first issue with traditional transition models is that they misrepresent 
global mobility equality. Demographic transition models assume that countries 
would have ‘progressed to full development' once they possess traits exhibited by 
affluent nations—variable fertility, stable mortality, low emigration, and high 
immigration. In contrast to classic demographic models that transition from 
emigration- to immigration-predominant, migration transitions based on economic 
equilibrium theory expect low emigration and low immigration in both the North 
and South. The expectation of an ideal configuration generates spuriousness in 
terms of mobility equality for migrants coming from countries with disadvantaged 
migrational positions (i.e., migration is restricted by a receiving country, or within-
country disadvantages deny mobility freedoms). We can conceptualize mobility 
inequality as the disparate freedom of cross-border movement, noting that mobility 
inequality is complex and multifaceted, encompassing structure and agency. For 
brevity in this example we will consider mobility inequalities based on the right to 
move granted by state policy via national origin. 
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There are two sides to this debate. First, models suggest that at a future time 
all countries worldwide would reach relative economic and human development 
equality, resulting in low emigration due to the lack of incentive to migrate to a 
superior location and high immigration because of attractive national political 
economies. If relative wellbeing via development implies emigration reduction, 
from where are immigrants coming? Zelinsky (1971, 231) and Appleyard (1992, 
21) concluded that immigration acceleration would be represented by circular 
movement among relatively equal states, thus redistributing the global population. 
Second, classic models can also be interpreted as applicable by development level 
where immigration is likely to occur between similar countries, i.e., North-North 
or South-South migration, but not South-North migration. This approach imposes 
a rigid modernization regime that invalidates processes of development outside 
distinct expectations and measurements, thereby reinforcing development 
disparities, subjugating non-conformant countries, and sustaining existing mobility 
inequalities for migrants originating from less-privileged nations. 
 
In addition, classic transition theories inadequately account for the role 
immigration policy and the state play in shaping international migration patterns. 
Using an example, we could conduct a counterfactual thought experiment, asking: 
would migration trends continue if all political and economic ties were removed, 
assuming no ecological or human-made crises? The answer is, likely not. At the 
national level, international migration systems theory asserts that migration systems 
are constructed via political, economic, social, and demographic contexts, 
incorporate feedback and adjustments, and other historical, cultural, colonial, and 
technological linkages, resulting in a general core group of receiving and sending 
countries (Kritz & Zlotnik 1992). At the individual-level, migration aspirations and 
capabilities theory asserts that within constraints of immigration policy, 
international migration will continue indefinitely due to the perpetual demand for 
family reunification and skilled and unskilled labor (Carling 2002; De Haas 2007). 
We may thus expect family reunification, return, and circular migration to continue; 
cultural interest or business necessity may draw a person and their network to a 
particular country; environmental crises or war and political repression may 
generate migration flows. Even in the absence of political-economic relations, 
transnational networks maintain cross-national ties.  
 
What then is the role of international immigration policy in influencing 
migration transitions? On the one hand, scholars argue economic openness 
undermines state control of immigration and naturalization policies (Sassen 1996; 
Hollifield 1998; FitzGerald, Cook-Martín, García, & Arar 2017). On the other 
hand, the state's capacity to control immigration has increased, and liberal states 
accept more immigrants because of domestic pressures rather than external ones 
7
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(Freeman 1998; Joppke 1998). Yet, no matter the stance, immigration policy is 
designed to keep the ‘wrong type’ of immigrants out (Castles, De Haas, & Miller 
2014). In the Global North immigration policies were originally created as 
protectionist political mechanisms against foreigners, but have morphed into 
socioeconomic mechanisms—used either as a means of inclusion to encourage 
economic growth by increasing the number of foreign workers to fill labor market 
demands or as a means of exclusion to protect the population from unemployment 
in an economic downturn by barring immigration. Despite dialogue that 
international migration is leading to the disintegration of state boundaries and 
political control, nations remain involved in decisions regarding state sovereignty, 
immigration policy, and border control. National immigration policy continues to 
shape international migration trends.  
 
 Lastly, traditional transition theories are flawed because there is little 
evidence that emigration from the South to the North has diminished since the 
1990s. We recall Zelinsky speculated that with modernity, the world would reach 
'mobility saturation,’ a Malthusian-esque concept akin to population carrying 
capacity theorem, which predicts that the world can sustain international migration 
only to a certain degree. Similarly, Martin and Taylor predicted a ‘migration 
trough’ when economic development substituted migration. These are erroneous on 
two counts. First, Appleyard (1992, 18) reminds us that net migration only affects 
population redistribution and not global population growth. Second, if the concepts 
of ‘mobility saturation’ and ‘mobility trough’ were legitimate, the world would 
have already achieved ‘saturation’ with no indication of reduced migration. These 
notions falsely assume that people migrate primarily for economic betterment, 
ruling out structural or individual drivers. Skeldon (1997) and De Haas (2007) 
argue that international mobility will continue because migration and development 
are interdependent integral parts of society.   
 
 Since the implementation of development policies in the 1960s and 70s, and 
again in the 1990s, United Nations’ data show that since 1960, international 
migration remains at about 3% of the world’s population (UN 2002). It is forecast 
to remain stable through 2050 (UNDESA 2013a). As of 2013, of the 136 million 
migrants who lived in the North (Europe, North America, or Oceania), 54 million 
(40%) came from other countries in the North, and 82 million (60%) came from the 
South (Africa, Asia, and Latin America/ Caribbean). Likewise, of the 96 million 
migrants residing in developing nations, 14 million (14%) came from the North, 
and 82 million (86%) originated from the South (UNDESA 2013b). Although more 
migrants live in the North, there are about the same number of migrants from the 
South in developing and developed countries (North: 81.8 million, South: 82.3 
million).  
8
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At the global level, although more migrants live in the North, international 
migration principally originates from the South. Of the migrants who come from 
the South, they tend to move regionally, meaning much of international migration 
from the South remains in the South. Most regional international migration occurs 
within five migration corridors: Asia to Asia, Europe to Europe, Latin 
America/Caribbean to North America, Africa to Africa, and Asia to Europe 
(UNDESA 2013b; Abel & Sander 2014). Bi-national migration corridors with the 
largest number of international migrants per year are from Mexico to the United 
States (South-North path), Sudan to South Sudan, Palestine to Jordan, Myanmar to 
Thailand (South-South paths), and India to the UAE (South-North path) (UNDESA 
2013b). Among North-North and South-North pathways, the US is the most 
popular destination. Among South-South and North-South pathways, Russia is both 
the leading destination and origin of migration (Anich, Brian, & Laczko 2013).  
 
Across the spectrum of countries and their development levels, a transition 
from emigration- to immigration-predominant can be observed. From here, two 
questions must be addressed: has increased cross-national economic development 
over time led countries to transition from less to more developed? If countries 
experienced economic transition, have individual countries experienced migration 
transition? Mahutga and Smith (2011) examine economic growth from 1965 to 
2000 and find Spain, China, Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea transitioned to 
higher positions in the international division of labor. They conclude that countries 
of intermediate economic development levels experienced the most growth, and 
state-sponsored development explains long-term economic upward mobility, not 
reliance on foreign assistance. However, not all countries that experienced 
economic advancement transitioned to sending countries. De Haas (2010) notes 
Spain, Italy, Malaysia, Taiwan, and South Korea transitioned from net emigration 
into net immigration countries. In the case of Italy and Spain, Cook-Martín (2008) 
demonstrates how structural changes brought about through economic and political 
development policies appear to have reversed the flow of migrants from Spain and 
Italy to Argentina.   
 
A Way Forward: Next Steps 
 
As to whether migration transition theory should be wholly abandoned or 
revisited, we should indeed abandon counterproductive rhetoric, intentions, and 
policy based on prior models that subordinate countries in and people from the 
Global South. However, migration transition theory can be revisited to better 
contextualize the development-migration relationship. Moving forward, we can 
recognize that a transition threshold exists and explore what and how changes 
9
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effectuate. For example, when applied to a development-migration continuum, we 
may observe how nations catalyze their own transition—with or without the added 
assistance of the international community. I suggest we advance future inquires in 
four different ways: (1) consider an S-curve theoretical framework for long-term 
international migration trends; (2) engage national, regional, and cross-national 
case studies; (3) employ advanced methods and comprehensive data; and (4) 
become involved in policymaking.   
 
Firstly, in comparison to classic demographic and economic transition 
models that theorized societal transformation (not transition) as stylized through an 
inverted U-curve, an S-shaped growth model as a heuristic device is more suitable 
because it shows that as development increases migration stabilizes. A sigmoid S-
curve conceptual model follows the equation S = 𝑥/√(1 + 𝑥2). Net migration 
would initially be modest at lower levels of development. As development 
increases, both emigration and immigration would increase (although one may be 
predominant over the other). At a threshold point, net migration would flatten. 
Along the standard sigmoidal curve, net migration would continue horizontally 
with higher development. Yet, it is possible countries may advance or regress along 
the curve, or that unforeseen factors may lead to a gradual increase or decrease in 
net migration after the initial stage of stabilization (Figure 2.1). The S-shape also 
smooths short-term fluctuations, absorbs gradual inclines or declines in net 
migration over time, and the curve would not drop sharply due to higher 
development. This model advances De Haas’ cross-sectional transition model 
because it allows flexibility along a long-term continuum of migration-
development characteristics. It incorporates mobility inequality across countries, 
national and international systems’ immigration policy influences, and long-term 
international migrational patterns. The model corresponds with dynamic, reversible 
migration trends. Countries at higher levels of development would have stable net 
migration (e.g., low emigration, stable immigration), and developing countries 
would not experience a reversal of emigration at a certain development inflection 
point, rather emigration and immigration would stabilize over time.  
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Figure 2. S-Curve Growth Model 
 
 
Figure 2.1. Classic Sigmoid S-Shaped Growth Curve 
 
 
 
 
The S-curve model is further supported by theoretical and empirical 
findings. In his study, De Haas finds curvilinear relationships between GDP per 
capita and HDI to net migration, however, in his composite model of GDP and HDI 
associations to total migration, the trends are S-shaped. Also, Martin and Taylor 
(1996) predicted that if migration and development were complements instead of 
substitutes, migration would plateau. From 1990 to 2000, migration stabilized in 
both the Global North and Global South, and it is estimated that after a slight peak 
experienced in the North from 2000 to 2010, worldwide migration will continue to 
stabilize through 2050 (UNDESA 2013a, 2013b).  
 
Next, applying the S-curve heuristic, we may pursue national or regional 
case studies to examine countries over time and possible predictive characteristics. 
There are three possible routes: already transitioned countries; countries that did 
not experience a transition; and potential transitional countries. Cook-Martín 
(2008) examined specific national case studies of migration transition for Italy and 
Spain, and Mahutga and Smith (2011) explored reasons that may explain structural 
economic mobility for countries like Indonesia, Thailand, and Korea, but further 
research could be done on Ireland, Malaysia, and other ‘Asian Miracle’ countries 
that experienced profound change. Studying transitioned countries could elucidate 
what factors are consequential, as well as examining countries in which transition 
did not occur. For instance, twenty-five years ago, Martin (1992, 1001) described 
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how Poland was of prime interest to migration scholars because it seemed to 
experience an emigration transition in the 1980s to an immigration country in the 
1990s. Poland has been a country of emigration since the 1960s and remains one of 
the top five sending countries (Anich, Brian, & Laczko 2013); what explains non-
transitions? In the same vein, it is also worthwhile to evaluate other post-Soviet 
countries in the region and other potential transition countries. Russia is the leading 
sending and receiving country for South-South corridors, and a top destination for 
North-South migration (Anich, Brian, & Laczko 2013). Russia may be an 
appropriate contemporary case study to examine a unique political and economic 
climate that could lead to stabilized internal, intra-regional, and international 
migration.  
 
For other countries that may experience migration transitions in conjunction 
with higher development, we could follow Skeldon’s (1997, 15) five-tier model to 
focus on international migration to the 'Expanding Core,' e.g., Brazil, China, and 
India, and the ‘Labour Frontier,’ Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, and Turkey, 
respectively. Immigration and development policies in and toward developing 
countries are important to assess since much intra-regional and international 
migration originate from comparable countries and because they have economic 
stability and state formation necessary for integrated cross-national mobility. In 
studying these cases within a global lens we may expect international migration 
may remain at ~3% of the world’s population, emigration from mid-level 
developing countries could stabilize—following an S-curve, and emigration within 
least developed countries will continue since they comprise the largest proportion 
of current international movement (Abel and Sander 2014).  
 
In terms of examining migration transitions through advanced methods and 
comprehensive data, De Haas (2010) and Sanderson (2009) provide sound 
methodological suggestions to analyze migration, development, and transitions 
across countries. De Haas (2010) provides a cross-sectional method to examine 
numerous countries across development levels, acknowledging that longitudinal 
data would be better, but limitations in high-quality cross-national longitudinal data 
are restrictive. Likewise, Sanderson (2009) provides well-justified suggestions to 
use cross-national panel data and recommends employing dynamic econometric 
analysis, such as OLS-dynamic models (OLSD), random-effects models (REM), or 
fixed-effects models (FEM). Longitudinal, cross-national data provide an 
advantage over cross-sectional data by avoiding potential unit-specific 
spuriousness and by introducing the measure of time. There are limitations to public 
source data availability before 1990. Where data are available, annual data points 
may be irregularly reported. These problems are compounded by data availability 
12
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for developing nations. With the advancement of data collection and availability, 
longitudinal data are ideal, although pooled data could be used. 
 
Based on research needs, both methods are applicable, however, scholars 
should proceed with discretion. Econometric models are popular among scholars 
whose primary interest is to examine the effect of economic development on 
international migration, using variables such as income inequality, international 
trade penetration, foreign direct investment, and the proliferation of banking and 
transnational corporations (Firebaugh 1999; Sanderson & Kentor 2009; Sanderson 
2013a, 2013b). While these studies help us understand between- and within-country 
economic disparities, research that includes human or social development measures 
is sparse. One exception is Sanderson’s (2010) assessment of the association and 
impact of cumulative international migration flows and human development index 
(HDI) indicators. However, he inadequately explains confounding effects on 
female labor force participation and female school enrollment due to insufficient 
inclusion of social and human development measures, especially those pertaining 
to the Global South, in the statistical models. As reference, Easterlin (2000) 
suggests that while people in developing regions may overtly express their need for 
economic amelioration, part of social development must include factors of 
wellbeing and political participation in addition to adequate, decent work. Utilizing 
sophisticated analysis models fitted to panel data that include economic and human 
social development measures may provide a more complete illustration of the 
relationship between international migration and development.   
 
The last suggestion—getting involved in policymaking—is not 
straightforward and eludes social scientists’ grasp to effectively enter a perennial 
conversation with policymakers to affect real positive changes. Among 
international migration scholars, policy-making engagement is a common 
discussion topic at national and international conferences. Yet, there seems no 
certain path on how to gain entrée and maintain presence. A reoccurring proposition 
is to have long-term research inform far-sighted immigration policy that would 
move past short-term reactionary election cycle politics and policymaking in efforts 
to benefit immigrants and a receiving economy. One avenue is for interdisciplinary 
scholars to join forces with international organizations to share information, collect 
empirical data, and build theory. For instance, to balance mutual interests, 
migration experts could advise policymakers on contemporary global migration 
trends as a way to create mobility corridors based on equal mobility opportunities. 
Moving forward, there is room to improve the capacity to be heard and involved in 
international migration and development issues. 
In conclusion, migration transition frameworks can inform appropriate 
long-term policy that reflects international migration and development trends. With 
13
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international migration estimates remaining stable through 2050, sustainable 
immigration policy should be far-sighted and mutually beneficial to the interests of 
sending and receiving nations, international organizations, and individual migrants. 
Policies should establish ethical protocol and vetting procedures, and aim to create 
safer passage for migrants, reduce clandestine and irregular migration, and 
recognize the human worth of migrants by providing them with programs and tools 
they may need to promote their wellbeing and success. This is salient given serious 
limitations in policy that adequately address political refugees and account for 
ecological refugees. For example, with increasing climate change, sustainable 
immigration policies in both the Global North and South should include 
mechanisms, programs, and personnel with which to respond to long-term en masse 
migration shifts. With immigration policy in place like this, instead of reacting 
extemporaneously, leaders may readily accommodate all types of migrants to 
reduce trauma. As social scientists, we can evaluate current regional and 
international migration trends against policy goals, and with more presence in the 
on-going dialogue, we can better inform sustainable international immigration 
policy for both the Global North and South. 
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